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THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
ANNUAL BEN FERENCZ PANEL 
This panel was convened at 10:45 am, Thursday, April IO, by its moderator, David Kaye 
of the University of California-Irvine, who introduced the panelists: Hans-Peter Kaul of the 
International Criminal Court; Milena Sterio of Cleveland State University; Jane Stromseth 
of the Office of Global Criminal Justice, U.S. State Department; and Dire Tladi of the 
University of Pretoria and Institute for Security Studies.* 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN 2013: 

THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS 

By Milena Sterio t 
INTRODUCTION 
While many events have shaped the development of international criminal law over the 
past year, the most significant ones, in my view, included the Special Court for Sierra Leone's 
appellate confirmation of the Charles Taylor verdict, as well as the United Nations Security 
Council's failure to refer the Syrian situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
THE CHARLES TAYLOR VERDICT 
On September 26, 2013, the Special Court for Sierra Leone's (SCSL) Appellate Chamber 
upheld the same tribunal's Trial Chamber's judgment and sentence of Charles Taylor to 50 
years of imprisonment for aiding and abetting murders, rapes, and other acts of violence 
during the Sierra Leonean civil war. 1 Charles Taylor served as President of Liberia during 
the 1990s, and in this capacity he actively supported Sierra Leonean rebel groups, responsible 
for some of the worst atrocities committed against this country's civilian population.2 
The Appellate Chamber's confirmation of the verdict against Taylor was tremendously 
significant in international criminal law. First, the guilty verdict coupled with the lengthy 
sentence (Charles Taylor is 65 years old, so the 50-year sentence effectively amounts to life 
imprisonment) represents an enormous achievement of international criminal law. Taylor is 
the first former head of state to be criminally prosecuted and sentenced since Nuremberg, 
and his prosecution and eventual judgment send a strong message of deterrence to other 
heads of state. Additionally, the Taylor judgment stands for the proposition that impunity 
will not be tolerated in international criminal law, and that traditional notions of sovereignty 
will not stand in the way of an international criminal prosecution. 
Second, the Taylor case underscores the importance of secondary liability in international 
criminal law. Taylor, like many other defendants in the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals, 
• Mr. Kaul, Ms. Stromseth, and Mr. Tladi did not contribute remarks to The Proceedings. 
t Charles R. Emrick Jr.-Calfee Halter & Griswold Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. I would 
like to thank ASIL for the opportunity to present these remarks at the 2014 Annual Meeting, as well as to commend 
my prestigious co-panelists (International Criminal Court Judge Kaul, Professor Jane Stromseth, and Professor Dire 
Vladi) for their insightful remarks, which have influenced the writing of these remarks. 
1 Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL 03­
01-A, Sept. 26, 2013, at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=t 14fjFP4jJ8=&tabid= 191. 
2 Marina Aksenova, The Taylor Appeal Judgment: Achievement ofFragmentation of International Criminal Law, 
Oct. 20, 2013, at http://www.e-ir.info/2013/10/20/the-taylor-appeal-judgment-an-achievement-or-another-step-in­
the-fragmentation-of-intemational-criminal-law/. 
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was prosecuted on the theory of accomplice liability-for having aided and abetted in the 
accomplishment of heinous crimes during the Sierra Leonean civil war.3 Since Taylor had 
no personal involvement or participation in the war, imposing secondary or accomplice 
liability on him was the only manner in which prosecution could proceed. The Appellate 
Chamber noted that ''individual criminal responsibility for aiding and abetting the planning, 
preparation or execution of a crime, as expressly provided for in Article 6( 1 ), is unquestionably 
well-established and fundamental in customary international law." 4 The Appellate Chamber 
thus confirmed that accomplice liability is a well-accepted mode of criminal liability in 
international criminal law, both under the SCSL Statute and in international custom. Moreover, 
the Appellate Chamber rejected the recent "trend" espoused by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY or Yugoslavia Tribunal), which demands that 
the aid and assistance must be geared towards the specific offense-the so-called ''specific 
direction" requirement.5 In fact, also in 2013, the Yugoslavia Tribunal acquitted two defen­
dants, Perisic and Stanisic, holding that the assistance which these defendants had provided 
was not specifically directed towards the commission of specific crimes, but was merely 
geared to the general war effort.6 This vision of complicity embraced by the Yugoslavia 
Tribunal narrowed down the scope of accomplice liability; the Taylor case rejected this 
approach and chose not to follow the Yugoslavia Tribunal's case law. While this seeming 
disagreement between the judges of the Yugoslavia Tribunal and the SCSL may have the 
negative consequence of preventing the development of a uniform norm of customary law 
on the issue of accomplice liability, the positive effects of the Taylor judgment are that it 
rejects any limitation on accomplice liability and that it may serve as an important precedent 
in any future prosecutions of former heads of state. 
Third, the Taylor judgment represents a significant development in the prosecution of 
gender-based crimes. The Taylor verdict is the first time that a former head of state has been 
convicted of various crimes of sexual violence. 7 Both the trial and the appellate judges 
recognized that rape, sexual slavery, and other forms of sexual violence were used during 
the Sierra Leonean conflict as a strategic weapon of warfare. In addition, these crimes ''were 
widespread and systematic, committed as part of a strategic campaign to impact the conflict 
by terrorising, demoralising, and destroying the affected civilian populations through sexual 
violence."8 Charles Taylor was convicted of aiding and abetting in the commission of such 
crimes of sexual violence, by providing logistical, financial, technical, medical, and other 
3 Id. 

4 Prosecutor v. Taylor, supra note I, para. 383. 

5 Aksenova, supra note 2. ICTY Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Feb. 28, 2013, 

at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/acjug/en/130228.Judgement.pdf; ICTY Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v. Stani­
sic, Case No. IT-03-69-T, May 30, 2013, at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stanisic_simatovidtjug/en/ 
130530.Judgement_pl.pdf. 
6 Much has been written about the Perisic and Stanisic acquittals. See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, Why the ICTY's 
"Specifically Directed" Requirement Is Justified, June 2, 2013, at http://opiniojuris.org/2013/06/02/why-the-ictys­
specifically-directed-requirement-is-justified/ (approving of the ICTY's "specific direction" requirement); but see 
Marko Milanovic, The Limits of Aiding and Abetting liability: The /CTY Appeals Chamber Acquits Momcilo 
Perisic, Mar. 11, 2013, at http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-limits-of-aiding-and-abetting-liability-the-icty-appeals-cham­
ber-acquits-momcilo-perisic/ (criticizing the ICTY's acquittal of Perisic). See also James G. Stewart, The ICTY 
Loses its Way on Complicity-Part J, Apr. 3, 2013, at http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/03/guest-post-the-icty-loses­
its-way-on-complicity-part-l/. 
7 Kelly Askin, Charles Taylor Judgment Is a Victory for Gender Justice, GUARDIAN, Apr. 27, 2012, available 
at http://www.theguardian.com/law/2012/apr/27/charles-taylor-judgment-victory-gender-justice. 
8 Id. 
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forms of support to the rebel groups. 9 While other international tribunals had already convicted 
defendants of such crimes, all such prosecutions involved defendants who had personally 
participated in the commission thereof. The Taylor case represents the first instance of 
accomplice liability imposed on a political leader, who while far removed from the battlefield, 
aided and abetted in the commission of sex crimes by providing encouragement and support 
and by not punishing the offenders. For victims of sexual violence, this development in 
international criminal law has long been overdue. 10 
Fourth, the Taylor judgment has contributed tremendously to the development of interna­
tional gender jurisprudence. 11 The Taylor case solidified the legal definition of sexual slav­
ery.12 In addition, the SCSL judges proposed to replace the term "forced marriage" with 
"conjugal slavery," recognizing that many female victims of the Sierra Leonean war were 
not officially "married" to their abductors, but were instead enslaved for the dual purpose 
of being repeatedly subjected to rape and being forced to engage in domestic labor. 13 This 
new term may better capture the nature of the heinous international crime which various 
rebel groups had been committing in Sierra Leone, and which Taylor aided and abetted. 14 
Finally, the Taylor trial judgment firmly established that an individual may be prosecuted 
for crimes against humanity of rape and sexual slavery, as well as for the war crimes of 
committing acts of terror and sexual violence. Thus, the Taylor case solidified the growing 
consensus that gender-based crimes can constitute both crimes against humanity (if committed 
on a systematic basis) and war crimes. 15 
In sum, the Taylor appellate verdict confirmed all of the relevant achievements of the 
trial chamber, which had, in its judgment, contributed to the development of both accomplice 
liability under international criminal law, as well as of the proposition that gender-based/ 
sexual violence crimes can be prosecuted both as crimes against humanity and as war crimes. 
THE ICC AND POLITICS: FAILURE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO 
REFER THE SYRIAN CASE TO THE ICC 
The second most significant development in international criminal law is the UN Security 
Council's failure to refer the Syrian situation to the ICC. This ''development'' is less fortunate 
than the previously discussed Taylor verdict, but it remains significant because it underscores 
the specific role which the ICC currently plays in international criminal justice as a court 
of law heavily influenced by international politics of the Great Powers. 16 
9 Jd. 
10 Id. ("The Taylor verdict represents a welcome and long overdue recognition that civilian or military leaders 
who are far from the battlefield but who support and encourage sexual violence, or make no attempt to prevent or 
punish it, can be held responsible for sex crimes."). 
11 Valerie Oosterveld, Gender and the Charles Taylor Case at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 19 WM. & 
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 7 (2012). 
12 Id. at 9. 
13 /d. 
14 ld. 
15 Id. (arguing that "the Taylor trial judgment was a step forward in international gender jurisprudence."). 
16 The term "Great Powers" as used in these remarks refers to the five permanent members of the Security 
Council (the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom). The term "Great Powers" has been 
used in other contexts to describe the G-8 countries, as well as other politically, militarily, and financially powerful 
nations. See, e.g., Milena Sterio, On the Right to External Self-Determination: "Selfistans," Secession and the 
Great Powers' Rule, 19 MINN. J. lNT'L L. 137 (2010). 
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In August 2013, reports surfaced that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had used chemical 
weapons against his own civilian population. 17 Syria has been plagued by an increasingly 
violent civil conflict since the Arab Spring of 2011, and these allegations reinforced the 
increasing sentiment that the international community ought to do something about the Syrian 
situation. However, the Security Council remained deadlocked because of the threat of 
Russian, and potentially Chinese, veto over any resolution that would authorize forceful 
measures against the Syrian regime, including a potential resolution referring the situation 
to the ICC. 18 The United States, while not directly threatening to veto a referral resolution, 
has so far not supported a referral to the ICC and has preferred exploring the possibility of 
establishing a Syrian ad hoc tribunal. 19 
Because of the ICC's jurisdictional structure, the Syrian situation may never be examined 
by this tribunal as Syria is not a state party to the court, and as all potential crimes seem to 
have been committed by Syrian nationals (nationals of a non-party).20 Thus, the only way 
that the ICC could examine potential humanitarian violations by the Syrian leadership would 
be through a Security Council referral. 21 The absence of the referral, because of the inherent 
veto structure of the Security Council, can be interpreted as having undermined the legitimacy 
of the tribunal, which appears powerless in the wake of Syrian violence. This in tum may 
be feeding a sense of impunity on behalf of the Syrian leadership. In fact, the latest report 
of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Syria stated plainly that "[t]he warring 
parties do not fear being held accountable for their acts." 22 Most agree that ICC involvement 
in the crisis would send a stronger message of deterrence to the Assad leadership, by signaling 
that flouting international law leads to serious consequences and potential accountability 
before the world's only permanent international criminal tribunal. 
Moreover, an ICC indictment of Syrian leaders could contribute to peace negotiations in 
Syria. Past practice from other conflicts and situations indicates that indictments of senior 
political and military leaders before international tribunals can actually contribute to strength­
ening peace efforts ''by delegitimizing and marginalizing those who stand in the way of 
17 Syria Chemical Attack: What We Know, BBC NEWS, Sept. 24, 2013, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ 
world-middle-east-23927399; see also United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical 
Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of 
Damascus on 21 August 2013, Sept. 13, 2013, available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/content/slideshow/ 
Secretary_ General_Report_of_ CW _Investigation.pdf. 
18 Louis Charbonneau & Michelle Nichols, U.N. Security Council Powers Meet Again on Syria; No Outcome, 
REUTERS, Aug. 29, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/29/us-syria-crisis-un-idUS­
BRE97Sl 7R20130829 (noting that Russia and China had vetoed three proposed resolutions that would have 
condemned the Assad regime and threatened United Nations sanctions). 
19 Balkees Jarrah, The United States Should Support ICC Involvement in Syria, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Mar. 
19, 2004, at http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/19/united-states-should-support-icc-involvement-syria. 
20 Article 12 of the ICC Statute specifies that the court may exercise jurisdiction if one of the following States 
is a party to the Statute: "The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred ...." or "The 
State of which the person accused of the crime is a national." Article 12 would thus preclude the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the ICC in a situation like Syria, where an alleged crime occurred on the territory of a non-state 
party, when such alleged crimes are committed by nationals of a non-state party. Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court art. 12, at http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30el6/0/ 
rome_statute_english.pdf [hereinafter ICC Statute]. 
21 Article 13(b) of the ICC Statute specifies that the court may exercise jurisdiction if "A situation in which one 
or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.'' ICC Statute, id., art. l 3(b). The exercise of such jurisdiction 
by the ICC through a Security Council referral is not limited by the territoriality or nationality basis of jurisdiction 
specified in Article 12. See id. art. 12. 
22 United Nations, Human Rights Council, 25th Sess., Report of the Independent International Commission of 
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Feb. 12, 2014, A/HRC/25/65, at I. 
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resolving the conflict. " 23 Some successful examples include the indictments of Radovan 
Karadzic, the Bosnian Serbs' political leader, and Ratko Mladic, their military commander, 
by the ICTY, which have been credited with preventing them from attending the Dayton 
peace talks, which led to the end of the Bosnian war.24 Similarly, the unsealing of the arrest 
warrant against former Liberian President Charles Taylor at the start of negotiations to end 
the Liberian civil war was generally viewed as helpful in moving these negotiations forward.25 
Many have argued, in the Syrian context, that ICC involvement should not represent the 
only step that the international community would undertake toward resolving the ongoing 
crisis, but that instead, the ICC could play a key role in developing a comprehensive peace 
plan and strategy in Syria, by forcing indicted Syrian leaders to remain outside any negotiations 
and by thus allowing others to take on leadership roles in Syria. 26 
It should be noted that the ICC has played an important role in other conflicts. In 2009, 
the ICC pre-trial chamber issued an arrest warrant against the Sudanese president Omar Al 
Bashir, who was indicted on various charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes; 
the ICC investigation into Sudan was made possible through a Security Council referral in 
2005.27 In that case, Russia voted in favor of the resolution, while the United States and 
China abstained.28 The ICC has also been actively investigating the Libyan situation, referred 
to the court in a unanimously passed 2011 Security Council resolution.29 While ICC involve­
ment in countries like Sudan and Libya could contribute to peace processes and conflict 
resolution, the ICC's jurisdiction unfortunately remains limited and tied to the politics of 
the Great Powers, such as the United States, Russia, and China. In cases where an ICC 
referral has coincided with the Great Powers' strategic interests, these countries have voted 
in favor of a Security Council resolution referring a situation to the court (as in the cases 
of Sudan and Libya).30 The Syrian situation, on the contrary, seems to have split the Great 
Powers along their geo-political interests, resulting in a veto threat by Russia and China, 
and in U.S. unwillingness to strongly support a referral (perhaps due to the United States' 
general opposition to the ICC). According to Richard Dicker, International Justice Director 
at Human Rights Watch, "When it comes to ICC referrals, the United States, Russia, and 
China seem more concerned about prosecuting their enemies and protecting their friends. 
This checkered approach has left victims of abuses in Syria, Gaza, and Sri Lanka without 
recourse to justice." 31 In addition, according to Dicker, "The Security Council's 'on again, 
23 See Jarrah, supra note 19. 
24 ld. 
25 ld. 
26 /d. 
27 For a detailed description of the Bashir case, see American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for 
the International Criminal Court, Investigations & Cases, Darfur, Sudan, Al Bashir, at http://www.amicc.org/icc/ 
albashir [hereinafter AMICC]; see Security Council Resolution 1593, Mar. 31, 2005, S/RES/1593 (2005), at http:// 
www .icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/85FEBD 1 A-29F8-4EC4-9566-48EDF55CC587 /283244/N0529273.pdf (referring the 
Darfur situation to the ICC). 
28 AMICC, at http://www.amicc.org/icc/referrals. 
29 Security Council Resolution 1970, Feb. 26, 2011, S/RES/1970 (2011), at http://www.onpcsb.ro/pdf/UN­
SC%20Resolution%201970.pdf. 
30 It should be noted that even these Security Council referrals were limited. "Both referrals imposed the entire 
financial burden of the new investigations and prosecutions on the court and its member countries. They also 
allowed exemptions for the nationals of non-member third countries should they be implicated in serious crimes 
committed in the referred country." See UN Security Council: Address Inconsistency in ICC Referrals, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, Oct. 16, 2012, at http://www.hrw.org/news/2012110/16/un-security-council-address-inconsistency­
icc-referrals-O. In addition, the Security Council has not actively supported the ICC in its investigations in Darfur 
and in Libya. Id. 
31 /d. 
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off again' approach to ICC referrals undermines its credibility in promoting justice. " 32 The 
ICC thus remains an important organ of international criminal justice whose role in world 
affairs has been limited by the politics of the Great Powers. 
CONCLUSION 
Many events in 2013 have contributed to the development of international criminal law; 
the ones which most profoundly impacted this field included the Charles Taylor appellate 
verdict and the Security Council's failure to refer the Syrian case to the ICC. The former is 
significant because it represents the first time since Nuremberg that a former head of state 
has been convicted by an international tribunal; the latter is important because it illustrates 
the ICC's peculiar role in international justice, as a court of law limited by international 
politics. 
32 Id. 
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